I’m very pleased that you can now find “John Dewey’s Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy” in the online “Articles in press” section at Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A. It’s part of a special issue by Kevin Elliott and Dan McKaughan on Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science, based on a great workshop organized by Kevin and Don Howard in 2013. You can also find a copy on my Academia.edu page.

I’m glad this is in print, because in many ways it is something of a sequel to my “Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk” paper in Philosophy of Science, in that (1) identifies an additional common tactic for opponents of the value-ladenness of science, the wedge strategy, and (2) it pushes further in the direction of offering a positive alternative to accounts of values in science that avoids the two problems I identified in the earlier paper (the problem of wishful thinking and the lexical priority of evidence over values).

“But wait!” I bet you’re thinking. This is a long paper full of Dewey exegesis, not a first-order argument in philosophy of science like your “Values in Science…” paper. (In this way, it’s also a sequel to my HOPOS paper, “John Dewey’s Logic of Science.”) Well, this is the particular vice of my philosophical thinking—at some point in my thinking on a topic, I tend to spiral through Dewey interpretation, at least for a while. Next comes a paper with less Dewey and more argument (hopefully).

Many thanks to Kevin, Dan, Don, and everyone who provided feedback on the paper!